Aristotle was the first philosopher to write ethical treatises, and begins by considering how to approach the subject. He argues that the correct approach for subjects like Ethics or Politics, which involve a discussion on beauty or justice, is to start by considering what would be roughly agreed to be true by people of good upbringing and substantial life experience, and then to work from those intuitions toward a more rigorous understanding. Over the course of the Ethics, Aristotle alternates between a theoretical/systematic approach to formalizing ethics and an empirical approach of consulting opinion, prior philosophical or literary works, and linguistic clues.
Aristotle’s ethics is said to be teleological, in that it is based on an investigation into the telos, or end, of a human. In Aristotle’s philosophy, the telos of a thing “can hardly be separated from the perfection of that thing”, and “the final cause of anything becomes identical with the good of that thing, so that the end and the good become synonymous terms”.
Taking this approach, Aristotle proposes that the highest good for humans is eudaimonia, a Greek word often translated as “flourishing” or sometimes “happiness”. Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is a way of taking action (energeia) that is appropriate to the human “soul” (psuchē) at its most “excellent” or virtuous (aretē). Eudaimonia is the most “complete” aim that people can have, because they choose it for its own sake. An excellent human is one who is good at living life, who does so well and beautifully (kalos). Aristotle says such a person would also be a serious (spoudaios) human being. He also asserts that virtue for a human must involve reason in thought and speech (logos), as this is a task (ergon) of human living.
After proposing this ultimate end of human activity, Aristotle discusses what ethics means. Aristotelian Ethics is about how specific beneficial habits (virtues) enable a person to achieve eudaimonia and how to develop a virtuous character (ethikē aretē). He describes a sequence of necessary steps: The first step is to practice righteous actions, perhaps under the guidance of teachers, in order to develop good habits. Practiced habits form a stable character in which those habits become voluntary, which then achieves eudaimonia.
The Greek word ēthos, or “character”, is related to modern words such as ethics and ethos. Aristotle does not equate character with habit (ethos in Greek, with a short “e“) because character involves conscious choice. Instead, character is an hexis like health or knowledge—a stable disposition that must be maintained with effort. However, good habits are a precondition for good character.
Aristotle reviews specific ways in which people are thought worthy of praise or blame. He describes how the highest types of praise require having all the virtues, and these in turn imply more than good character, indeed a kind of wisdom. The four essential virtues are:
Magnanimity (“great soul”), which requires a correct attitude towards the honor this involves, in Book IV.
Justice, as established by a good ruler in a good community, in Book V.
(The Eudemian Ethics VIII.3 also uses the word “kalokagathia“, the nobility of a gentleman (kalokagathos), to describe this same concept of a virtue encompassing all the moral virtues.)
The view that praiseworthy virtues in their highest form, even virtues such as courage, require intellectual virtue, is a theme Aristotle associates with Socrates; it is portrayed in the Socratic dialogues of Plato. Aristotle professes to work differently from Plato by trying to start with what well-brought up men would agree with, and to take a practical approach, but by Book VII Aristotle argues that the highest of virtues is not a practical one: contemplative wisdom (theōria). However, achieving wisdom requires all the virtues of character, or “moral virtues”.
Aristotle’s view that the highest good for man has both a practical and theoretical side is in the tradition of Socrates and Plato—but in opposition to pre-Socratic philosophy. As Ronna Burger points out: “The Ethics does not end at its apparent peak, identifying perfect happiness with the life devoted to theōria; instead it goes on to introduce the need for a study of legislation, on the grounds that it is not sufficient only to know about virtue, but one should try to put that knowledge to use.” At the end of the book, according to Burger, the thoughtful reader is led to understand that “the end we are seeking is what we have been doing” while engaging with the Ethics.
Book I
Book I attempts to define the subject matter of ethics and justify his method for examining it. As part of this, Aristotle considers common-sense opinions along with those of poets and philosophers.
Who should study ethics, and how
Aristotle points out that “things that are beautiful and just, about which politics investigates, involve great disagreement and inconsistency, so that they are thought to belong only to convention and not to nature“. For this reason Aristotle says we should not demand exacting rigor (akribeia), like we might expect from a mathematician, but rather look for answers about “things that are so for the most part”. He claimed that people are satisfactory judges of such subjects after they become acquainted with them. However as the young (in age or in character) are inexperienced, they are less likely to benefit from this kind of study.
I.6 contains a famous digression in which Aristotle appears to question his “friends” who “introduced the forms”. This refers to Plato and his school, and their Theory of Forms. Aristotle says that while both “the truth and one’s friends” are loved, “it is a sacred thing to give the highest honor to the truth”, signaling his belief that the Theory of Forms is not that. A Forms-based discussion of the Good might try to discover some characteristic that all good things have in common. Aristotle does not find this approach promising because the word “good” is used in too many ways. He says that while it is probably not coincidental that various things called good share that description, it is perhaps better to “let go for now” the quest for some common characteristic, as this “would be more at home in another type of philosophic inquiry”: not helpful for discussing how people should act, in the same way that doctors do not need to philosophize over the definition of health in order to treat each case.
The opening passage asserts that all technical arts, all investigations (every methodos, including the Ethics itself), indeed all deliberate actions and choices, aim at some good apart from themselves. Many such goods are intermediate, desired only as means to higher goods.
Aristotle asserts that there is one highest good—eudaimonia (traditionally translated as “happiness” or “flourishing”)—which is what good politics should target, because what is best for an individual is less beautiful (kalos) and divine (theios) than what is good for a people (ethnos) or community (polis). Politics organizes communal practical life, so the proper aim of politics should include the proper aim of all other pursuits, and “this end would be the human good (tanthrōpinon agathon)”. The human good is a practical target, in contrast to Plato’s references to “the Good itself”. Aristotle concludes that ethics (“our investigation” or methodos) is “in a certain way political”.
Aristotle then elaborates on the methodological concern with exactness. He claims that ethics, unlike some other types of philosophy, is inexact and uncertain. He says that it would be unreasonable to expect demonstrations of strict mathematical exactitude, but rather “each man judges correctly those matters with which he is acquainted”.
Aristotle states that while most would agree to call the highest aim of humanity eudaimonia, and also to equate this with both living well and doing things well, disagreement about what this is persists between the majority (hoi polloi) and “the wise”. He distinguishes three possible ways of life that people associate with happiness:
the way of slavish pleasure
the way of refined and active honorable politics
the way of contemplation
Aristotle mentions two other possibilities that he argues can be discarded:
passive virtue that suffers evils and misfortunes. Aristotle says no one would propose such a thing unless sacrificing to defend a shaky hypothesis (as Sachs points out, this is what Plato depicts Socrates doing in his Gorgias).
money making, which Aristotle asserts is a life based on a merely intermediate good
Each commonly proposed happy way of life is a target that some people aim at for its own sake, just like they aim at happiness itself for its own sake. As for honor, pleasure, and intelligence (nous), as well as every virtue, though they lead to happiness, even if they did not we would still pursue them.
Happiness in life, therefore, includes the virtues, and Aristotle adds that it would include self-sufficiency (autarkeia)—not the self-sufficiency of a hermit, but of someone with a family, friends, and community—someone whose eudaimonia leaves them satisfied, lacking nothing.
To describe more clearly what happiness is like, Aristotle next asks what the work or function (ergon) of a human is. All living things have nutrition and growth as a work, all animals (according to Aristotle’s definition of animal) have perception as part of their work, but what work is particularly human? The answer according to Aristotle is that it must involve reason (logos), including both being open to persuasion by reasoning, and thinking things through. Not only does human happiness involve reason, but is also an active being-at-work (energeia), not just a potential. And it is measured over a lifetime, because “one swallow does not make a spring”. The definition given is therefore:
The Good of man is the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them. Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make a spring.
— Rackham translation of I.7.1098a.
Because the good of a person is a work or function, just as we can contrast casual harpists with serious harpists, the person who lives well and beautifully in this actively rational and virtuous way will be a “serious” (spoudaios) person.
If happiness is virtue, or a certain virtue, then it must not just be a condition of being virtuous, potentially, but an actual way of virtuously “being at work” as a human. For as in the Ancient Olympic Games, “it is not the most beautiful or the strongest who are crowned, but those who compete”. And such virtue will be good, beautiful, and pleasant; indeed Aristotle asserts that in most people different pleasures are in conflict with each other while “the things that are pleasant to those who are passionately devoted to what is beautiful are the things that are pleasant by nature and of this sort are actions in accordance with virtue”. External goods are also necessary in such a virtuous life, because a person who lacks things such as good family and friends might find it difficult to be happy.
Questions that might be raised about the definition
Aristotle addresses some objections that might be raised against his proposed definition of eudaimonia.
First, he considers a Socratic question (found for example in Plato’s Meno) of whether eudaimonia might be a result of learning or habit or training, or perhaps divine grace or random chance. Aristotle says that eudaimonia does result from some sort of learning or training. But, although not god-given, eudaimonia is one of the most divine things, and “for what is greatest and most beautiful to be left to chance would be too discordant”.
Neoptolemus killing Priam. Aristotle accepted that it would be wrong to call Priam unhappy only because his last years were unhappy.
Aristotle says eudaimonia must be considered over a lifetime, otherwise Priam, for example, might be defined as unhappy only because of his unhappy old age.
Concerning the importance of chance to eudaimonia, Aristotle argues that a person at work in accordance with virtue “will bear with dignity whatever fortune sends, and will always make the best of his circumstances, as a good general will turn the forces at his command to the best account, and a good shoemaker will make the best shoe that can be made out of a given piece of leather, and so on with all other crafts”. Only many great misfortunes will limit how blessed such a life can be, but “even in these circumstances something beautiful shines through”.
Aristotle says that it “seems too unfeeling and contrary to people’s opinions” to claim that the postmortem “fortunes of one’s descendants and all one’s friends have no influence at all” on one’s eudaimonia. But he says it seems that if anything at all gets through to the deceased in this indirect way, whether good or bad, it would be something faint and small.
Aristotle distinguishes virtue and eudaimonia. Virtue, through which people “become apt at performing beautiful actions” is praiseworthy, while eudaimonia is something beyond praise: blessed, “since every one of us does everything else for the sake of this, and we set down the source and cause of good things as something honored and divine”.
Introduction to the rest of the Ethics
Aristotle asserts that some things can be accepted about the soul (another reference to Plato), including the division of the soul into rational and irrational parts, and the further division of the irrational parts into two parts:
one that is “not human” but “vegetative” and most at work during sleep, when virtue is least obvious
another that is amenable to reason: “the faculty of appetite or of desire” in the soul that can comprehend and obey reason, much as a child can act “rationally” not by reasoning but by obeying a wise father.
The virtues then are similarly divided, into intellectual (dianoetic) virtues, and virtues of character concerning the irrational part of the soul that is amenable to reason.
This second set of virtues, “moral virtues” as they are often translated, are the central topic of Book II.
Books II–III: Concerning excellence of character, or moral virtue
Aristotle says that whereas intellectual virtue requires teaching, experience, and time, virtue of character comes about as a consequence of adopting good habits. Humans have a natural capacity to develop these virtues, but that training determines whether they actually develop.
Aristotle says moral virtues are found at a mean (mesótēs) between deficiency and excess. For example, someone who flees is a coward (with a deficiency of bravery, or an excessive response to fear), while someone who fears nothing is rash (the opposite extreme). The virtue of courage is a “mean” between these two extremes. For this reason, Aristotle is considered a proponent of the golden mean doctrine. People first perform actions that are virtuous, possibly guided by teachers or experience; these habitual actions then become virtues when people characteristically choose such actions deliberately.
According to Aristotle, character, properly understood, is not just any tendency or habit but something that influences what causes pleasure or pain. A virtuous person feels pleasure when they perform the most beautiful or noble (kalos) actions; their practice of virtues and their pleasure therefore coincide. A person who is not virtuous, on the other hand, often finds pleasure to be misleading. For this reason, the study of virtue (or of politics) requires consideration of pleasure and pain.
It is not enough to perform virtuous actions by chance or by following advice. It is not like in the productive arts, where the product is judged as well-made or not. To be a virtuous person, one’s virtuous actions must be
done knowingly
chosen for their own sakes
chosen according to a stable disposition (not on a whim, or uncharacteristically).
Just knowing what would be virtuous is not enough.
According to Aristotle’s analysis, the soul contains:
Virtues are hexeis — none of the other qualities of the soul are chosen, and none is praiseworthy in the way that virtue is.
As with the productive arts (technai), with virtues of character the focus must be on the making of a good human in a static sense, and on making a human that functions well as a human.
In II.7 Aristotle gives a list of character virtues and vices that he discusses in Books II and III. This list differs between the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. He reiterates that it is not meant to be exhaustive.
Aristotle also mentions some “ways of observing the mean” that involve feelings or emotions: a sense of shame, for example, is sometimes praised, or said to be in excess or deficiency. Righteous indignation (nemesis) is a sort of mean between schadenfreude and envy. Aristotle says he intends to discuss such cases later, before the discussion of Justice in Book V. But the Nicomachean Ethics does not discuss righteous indignation there (which is however discussed in the Eudemian Ethics Book VIII).
Aristotle says that in practice people tend by nature towards the more pleasurable of the vicious extremes, and therefore to them the virtuous mean appears to be relatively closer to the less pleasant extreme. For this reason it is a good practice to steer toward the extreme that is less pleasant while you are hunting for the mean, which will help to correct for that tendency. However this rule of thumb is shown in later parts of the Ethics to apply mainly to some bodily pleasures, and Aristotle asserts it to be wrong as an accurate general rule in Book X.
Moral virtue as conscious choice
Aristotle begins by distinguishing human actions as voluntary & involuntary, and chosen & unchosen, and investigates what makes an action worthy of praise or blame, honor or punishment, and pardon or pity.
Aristotle divides wrong actions into three categories:
Voluntary (ekousion) acts which are caused by a person’s will or desire or choice.
Involuntary or unwilling (akousion) acts, which are caused by some outside factor or by ignorance (for example the wind carries a person off, or a person has a wrong understanding of the particular facts of a situation).
“Non-voluntary” or “non willing” actions (ouk ekousion) that are bad actions done by choice, but not deliberately, for example actions that are demanded from us under threat, or actions that are the lesser evil when no good actions are available. If you regret a non-voluntary wrong action of this sort, it is effectively equivalent to an involuntary action for the purposes of assigning blame.
The two varieties of ignorance differ as to how they affect blame. Ignorance of what is good and bad is itself blameworthy—a sign of bad character. But once the difference is learned, misconceptions about some particular situation that leads to choosing the bad while thinking it good is excusable. Aristotle explains this in terms of syllogistic reasoning. Imagine a syllogism of this form: “It would be bad to serve poison to your father. This glass of wine has been poisoned. Therefore it would be bad to serve this glass of wine to your father.” Serving the wine in ignorance of the first (universal) premise, but not the second, is depraved. Ignorance of the second (particular) premise, but not the first, is merely a mistake.
Aristotle defines and discusses several more critical terms:
Deliberate choice (proairesis): “seems to determine one’s character more than one’s actions do”. Things done on the spur of the moment, and things done by animals and children, can be willing, but driven by desire and spirit and not deliberate choice. Choice is rational and can be in opposition to desire. Choice always concerns realistic aims and available actions (which distinguishes it from “opinion” which can be about anything).
Deliberation (bouleusis), at least for sane people, does not include theoretical contemplation about universals, nor about distant things, nor about things already precisely known, such stand or sit. “We deliberate about things that are up to us and are matters of action” and concerning things where it is unclear how they will turn out. Deliberation is therefore not about reasoning which ends to pursue (health, for example) but how to think through the means of achieving those ends. When desire (for an end) and deliberation (about the means) combine, a choice is born.
Wishing (boulēsis) is something like deliberation, but focuses on ends rather than means. Contrary to some theories, Aristotle says that people do not wish for what is good by definition (though perhaps for what appears to be good). A worthy (spoudaios) person, however, does wish for what is “truly” good. Most people are misled by pleasure, “for it seems to them to be a good, though it is not”.
My Review:
Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle, is the type of work that everyone should read. Despite being a product of antiquity, its ideas remain timeless. The translation by W.D. Ross, and the narration by Michael Prichard, give a modern expression to the ancient ideas presented within the book, such that I had no trouble, at any point, in understanding the text or its message.
This is a difficult type of work for which to provide a review. Am I going to write in all of my 21st century reasoning that I take issue with the ancient wisdom of the Greeks? No. I was actually surprised at how readily I found myself agreeing with the author. I expected to run into at least a few big major points of divergence, but those never really arrived. So instead of attempting to critique Aristotle, I’ll give my experience of reading the book.
Initially, I tried to just listen to it quickly. However, I found that this was a poor strategy for me. The material is dense, and it builds upon itself, so too quick a journey through it really depleted the value of the book. Instead, after some trial and error, I undertook to tackle the text, one section at a time, and try to digest it slowly, so that I could have the totality of the work in my mind, as I started each new section. That made the book a much slower read for me, than my usual reading endeavors, but it was a more worthwhile one.
There has been debate about the meaning of “Nicomachean” but most seem to agree that it is a reference to Aristotle’s son, Nicomachus. As a result, the book was likely either directly for his son, or dedicated to him, with the purpose of giving advice on how to live and to live well. For Aristotle, living well is a pursuit of happiness, though he takes pains to define what that means, including therein living in a virtuous and energetic manner. The picture we see at the end of the book is that of an energetic and self-sufficient man, with a family, and active in his community. He is moral and enjoys pleasurable things in moderation.
What I found fascinating about the book is how relevant it felt to consume its content. In most respects, people are the same as they always were, and with similar problems and concerns. As a result, advice from someone more than two thousand years dead can continue to be good advice. Nicomachean Ethics felt like a book that could have been published this year. The 20th century brought with it nihilism, and post-modernism, and increasingly 21st century people are finding those philosophies lacking. Human beings have an innate need for purpose, fulfillment, and a pursuit of happiness that seems achievable. As those things have proven increasingly hard for some to find (despite more worldwide financial prosperity than ever before), we have seen a return to classical thought. Jerry Seinfeld (for example) has recently been publicly extoling the virtues of Marcus Aurelius and stoicism. We have witnessed a wave of American and British celebrities embracing traditional Roman Catholicism, along with an embrace of the Latin language. Some of the most popular social media accounts out there are just sharing classical art and architecture. I would offer that if we are digging into the foundations of Western Civilization, looking for insight and guidance, that we should not neglect Aristotle.
Nicomachean Ethics is a relatively short read, though as I said, I advise taking time with it. The W.D. Ross translation is excellent and easy to follow. This book is a 2,500 year old text on philosophy and life advice, and I completely recommend giving it some of your time.
It’s odd to say that ancient Greek philosophy has become trendy, but I think that’s the case. On the other hand, it was trendy in the sense that it was part of a standard Western education for centuries so maybe I should not be so surprised.
The renewed longing for purpose or direction in the wake of postmodernism has been identified by some thinkers as “metamodernism.” This could involve a return to classical thought or Catholicism—and I agree these are trending—but it could also involve adopting any purpose that one finds appealing, in a postmodern and “post-rational” mood where one ceases to look for intellectual justification. I think this could explain some aspects of modern politics.
It seems a little odd that so much of his advice is practical when teleological thinking seems to me putting the cart before the horse.
Interesting. What then, do you think, is the horse?
Aristotle wrote about cultivating virtues so we would make good decisions; I would say those virtues are the horse and the end result is the cart.
Well said!
My son has been mentioning stoicism over the past 6 months. Interesting read. Ty.
It’s odd to say that ancient Greek philosophy has become trendy, but I think that’s the case. On the other hand, it was trendy in the sense that it was part of a standard Western education for centuries so maybe I should not be so surprised.
The renewed longing for purpose or direction in the wake of postmodernism has been identified by some thinkers as “metamodernism.” This could involve a return to classical thought or Catholicism—and I agree these are trending—but it could also involve adopting any purpose that one finds appealing, in a postmodern and “post-rational” mood where one ceases to look for intellectual justification. I think this could explain some aspects of modern politics.
Thanks for a thought-provoking article!
You’re welcome! Thanks for a great comment. You might be right. We live in interesting times, for sure.